







The practice of slave stealing spans the history of American slavery. From the moment that Africans were first enslaved in the American colonies, and became a form of property, slave stealing began. The cases themselves, the way in which the culprits were dealt with, and the public and political responses are extremely revealing. The theft of human property was clearly a complicated crime and those involved, whether deliberately or inadvertently, came from a variety of backgrounds. Thus, investigating the phenomenon of slave stealing reveals the fundamental anxieties and volatility that characterized antebellum society, demonstrating that the everyday lives of southerners, free and unfree, were in large measure shaped by behaviors that transgressed custom and law and challenged many of the assumptions upon which racialized slavery as a system rested. Furthermore, incidents of slave stealing, of one form or another, occurred on such a scale that any full consideration of the lives of the enslaved ought to consider the (far from rare) experience of being stolen. The instances of theft involved other southerners, too, who have not always received the attention in the historiography that they merit: poor whites, small-scale slave owners, and free people of color. Uncovering these histories and integrating them into the broader narrative provides fascinating new insights into the ‘peculiar institution’ and its evolution over time and space. 

From a historiographical perspective, attention to this topic is long overdue. Slave stealing has not yet attracted serious scholarly attention. Although it was, as John Hope Franklin acknowledges, a common occurrence, the phenomenon draws only passing references in one or two studies, offering no analytical framework by which to understand the theft of human property.​[1]​ Indeed, many key texts have failed to recognize the practice at all. Studies by Walter Johnson and Michael Tadman, for example, have illuminated much about the story of the legal slave trade and its intricacies, but the illicit, indeed, by its very nature covert, story of the illegal trafficking of slaves (whether for profit or other reasons) remains very much in the shadows of the historiography.​[2]​ Besides being very much part of the lived experience of enslavement for many enslaved men and women, the stealing of this ‘troublesome’ human property highlighted the fundamental contradiction inherent in southern law, between recognition of the humanity of the enslaved and their status as chattel. Historians such as Eugene Genovese and James Oakes have pointed to the centrality of that conflict to destabilizing ‘the peculiar institution,’ in particular in the antebellum era and the decades leading up to the Civil War.​[3]​ The struggle to define clearly the perimeters of the theft of a slave, for example in the frequent notion that the stolen slave was “enticed,” rather than an agent in her or his own theft, is a stark indicator of the South’s inability to create a consistent legal framework. Indeed, a coherent and forceful framework, that both secured slavery as a system in which the slave was mere chattel, while recognizing, albeit reluctantly, that slaves were in fact also humans capable of autonomy, was essential in southern courtrooms in order to defend individual  property rights and secure the institution itself. 

However, slave stealers did not merely highlight the incongruities of the laws that dealt with human property, they also drew attention to the paradoxes that persistently plagued southern society and fueled growing social discord in the antebellum and Civil War eras. Although the motivations and methods of slave stealers differed considerably, the impact of their illegal activities and transgressions damaged the pillars on which southern society rested. From the opportunistic “negroe thieves,” who hoped to profit from the theft and re-sale, to the humanitarian abolitionists, attempting to ‘steal’ freedom for the enslaved, to those who simply sought to rescue an ill-treated individual or free a family member, friend or lover, all those who attempted to steal human property posed a threat to the southern way of life. Whether acting alone or working in partnerships, or gangs or as part of the national anti-slavery movement, slave stealing men and women, black and white, free and unfree, challenged planter hegemony and exposed the fragility of nineteenth-century social constructions of identity. Slave stealers blurred the boundaries of class, race, and gender and, in the decades leading up to the Civil War, the polarizing responses to slave stealing became a powerful indication of the volatility of slave society. Thus, to many in the South, those involved in slave stealing were regarded as dangerous dissidents. They contributed to the rising sense of insecurity over the future of the institution of slavery and, therefore, shaped southern political thought in this era.

This is evident, for example, in the extent to which politicians, lawmakers, and slave owners expressed their fear of the threat from within the white South as much as they feared attacks from those who lived outside of the South. Slave stealing highlights the fragmented nature of southern society. At times, southerners felt that conciliation or achieving a pro-slavery consensus among white southerners was as important as the conflict with their critics in the North and their clashes with abolitionists. As the works of Merton Dillon, Timothy Lockley, and Jeff Forret have recently indicated, the possibility of co-operation between poor whites, the enslaved, and free people of color, particularly in joint criminal ventures such as the selling of stolen goods, was a haunting specter foretelling the collapse of their way of life for many southern planters.​[4]​ Debates about poor southern whites’ involvement in the theft not only of plantation produce, but also of slaves themselves encouraged legislators to pass increasingly repressive laws regarding the punishment of slave stealers and to reward informers. Furthermore, during the nineteenth century attempts were made to curtail the rights of free blacks, who were assumed to be a significant part of the problem.​[5]​ 

Kentucky offers a particularly valuable case study because, as in all the border states, by the middle of the nineteenth century the future of slavery seemed particularly uncertain and was fiercely contested. Slavery had come early to Kentucky, effectively having been inherited from Virginia. Pioneers from that state brought their enslaved laborers with them and by 1790, two years before statehood, they constituted 16.2% of Kentucky’s population. Although the slave population initially rose steadily and continued to grow, it was outstripped by a rapidly rising free white population. On the eve of civil war in 1860, the enslaved comprised less than 20% of Kentuckians. In part, this relative decline of slavery reflected the extent to which agriculture in Kentucky simply required less labor than rice or cotton planting. Indeed, demand for labor in the cotton fields of the Deep South stimulated the export of slaves from Kentucky after 1830 and many were ‘sold down the river.’​[6]​ 

Yet it was not simply the economic realities of the cotton boom that hampered slavery’s future in Kentucky. While slavery itself had been established early in the state’s history, so too had a dissenting anti-slavery tradition. The earliest Kentuckian opponents of the institution were inspired by the example of the Northern states that had put slavery on the road to extinction in the aftermath of the revolution. For example, the Presbyterian Minister David Rice published a vigorous call for abolition, entitled Slavery Inconsistent with Justice and Good Policy, in 1792.​[7]​ Three months later, he and his supporters failed to prevent the new state from adopting a profoundly pro-slavery constitution but opposition to slavery remained persistent and vocal.​[8]​ Although always a minority position, the enemies of slavery in Kentucky were not cowed or easily silenced. In 1822, the Kentucky Abolition Society began publishing its own newspaper, the Abolition Intelligencer and Missionary Magazine, one of only a handful of antislavery papers published regularly in the whole of the Union at that time. In addition, in 1849 an emancipation party polled 10,000 votes in state elections. And from the 1830s onwards, national opposition to slavery found in the Kentuckian planter Cassius Clay, one of its most famous champions.​[9]​ It would be a mistake to inflate the threat posed to slavery in the state by Kentucky’s abolitionist minority. Nevertheless, practical and effective opposition to slavery manifested itself along a spectrum of activities, enacted by an informal alliance of black and white, free and enslaved, and embracing slave resistance on the plantation, flight and escape, theft of slave property, and political agitation.​[10]​ The presence of an abolitionist tradition in a slave state, combined with the physical proximity of free soil, made ‘slave stealing’ in Kentucky a particularly vexing matter for the defenders of the South’s ‘Peculiar Institution.’      

The state legislature and judicial system was considered to be the vanguard which would protect slavery and property rights. Laws that were debated and adopted in the South offer useful insights into the concerns of those who owned human property and the problems they faced. They demonstrate the willingness of those governing the South to take swift and punitive action against anyone accused of stealing slaves. The law completely excluded the notion of slave agency or culpability in the variety of activities and cases that amounted to slave stealing when, in fact, the crime often could not have taken place without the consent or co-operation of slaves. Once apprehended, the enslaved immediately reverted to chattel and, in court, were represented as simply property that had been enticed, seduced, carried away, or abducted. Regardless of the circumstances of the case, responsibility for the crime fell on free members of society. Thus, slave stealing was often perceived in racialized terms, in which ‘hapless’ black chattel was stolen by white criminals. Although this notion could be interpreted as actually accommodating established notions of white hegemony and the laws of the South were constructed to support this supposition, the reality often proved to be a different story; one that in fact indicated many people were willing to break the law and flout racial mores rather than bolster them. 

Naturally, however, many law-abiding citizens of the North and the South considered slave stealing a heinous crime. Those who stole and trafficked human property, whether purely for profit or ideologically driven, were, alike, accused of ‘negro stealing.’ Even men and women who simply helped, sheltered or were found in the company of slaves, and who certainly did not consider themselves thieves or abolitionists, were prosecuted for slave stealing. If caught these men and women were indicted for violating the laws regarding “abduction and stealing of slaves,” “kidnapping,” “enticing,” “conveying,” “removing,” “secreting” and, also, “aiding and abetting slaves” to escape or evade their labor.​[11]​ Throughout the colonial and antebellum period, numerous laws were ratified with the intention of securing slave property and defending slave owners against the growing threats of both illegal trafficking and abolitionism, though abolition and abolitionists were never explicitly mentioned in any laws that were passed. Evidentially, slave stealing was one of the most difficult problems of slave government and laws that were enacted were stringent and subject to a process of continued revision and refinement, especially in the border states, as the proximity of free soil heightened the insecurity felt by slave owners.   

The first laws specifically dealing with stolen slave labor came with the introduction of servitude and slavery in the seventeenth century.​[12]​ By the early 18th century, more specific acts threatened to punish convicted slave stealers with “death without benefit of clergy.”​[13]​ As slavery spread south and west, so too did laws dealing with the theft of the enslaved. Kentucky initially adopted the slave code of Virginia, but like all southern states, persistently debated the treatment of slaves and updated legal codes that dealt with “Slaves,” “Runaways,” “Fugitives,” and “Free Negroes.”​[14]​ In 1798, in an attempt to pull together and rationalize their slave codes, the Kentucky legislature reduced “into one; several acts respecting Slaves, Free Negroes, Mulattoes and Indians.” This act made it clear that the theft of labor, temporarily or permanently, would not be tolerated and, furthermore, that those found harboring or entertaining slaves “would be punished with a fine dependent on the severity of the theft.”​[15]​ Indeed, as the American justice system moved away from corporal punishment, southern states threatened slave stealers with jail time and hefty fines rather than the death penalty.​[16]​ At the turn of the nineteenth century, Kentucky legislators punished those convicted of “Larceny of a slave” and “any person or persons” who “shall steal any negro, mulatto or Indian slave” with “confinement in the jail and penitentiary house, for a period not less than two years, nor more than nine years.”​[17]​ 

Living on the geographical borders of slavery, but no less invested in the institution, Kentucky slave owners were a particular target for those who wished to steal slaves. The “horde of pirates who infest the waters of the Ohio on both its banks,” like the infamous slave stealing gang headed by John Murel, who was prosecuted in 1834 for slave stealing,  and the rising support for abolitionism from the 1830s caused much alarm and the General Assembly of Kentucky took these concerns seriously.​[18]​ In the decades leading up to the Civil War, pre-existing laws were reviewed and adjusted. New and more punitive laws were enacted in response to the mounting threat. Initially, the Kentucky General Assembly passed an “An Act to amend the law concerning slaves” in 1830. This revision distinguished between those who trafficked stolen slaves “within the state” and those who stole, assisted, or seduced slaves “to parts without the limits of the state, to any other states, or a foreign country.” Those who stole slaves within the state were to “pay a fine not less than fifty dollars” and a maximum of five hundred dollars. However, those who were willing to take slaves beyond the Kentucky state borders were deemed to be a more serious menace to citizens and slave owners. Thus, those found guilty of attempting to or successfully transporting stolen slaves out of state could be incarcerated for up to twenty years, more than double the penalty imposed in the previous decade.​[19]​ As the sectional conflict picked up pace and reached crisis point in the 1850s, the threat posed by the enemies of slavery encouraged Kentucky’s legislators to take drastic action. In 1856, in an attempt to deter all slave stealers a new, separate “Act for punishing negro stealing” decreed that those convicted could be sent to jail and “at the discretion of a jury, be so confined for life.”​[20]​ Thus, in Kentucky on the eve of the Civil War slave stealing carried a life sentence; a clear expression of the high level of anxiety felt by those who owned human property or whose livelihoods and identity were entwined with slavery.

As a result of the wide-scoping laws and the persistency with which slave stealers were pursued, numerous free men and women, in a variety of situations, were arrested and put on trial in Kentucky for slave stealing. As has been well documented, abolitionists who actively aided or sheltered runaways were accused of ‘slave stealing.’ They were, perhaps, the most reviled and feared slave stealers and their trials often garnered nationwide attention. The consensus among slave owners and much of the population was that abolitionists were thieves who were not simply mounting attacks on individuals, but were also attempting to overthrow the institution that formed the bedrock of southern society. In Kentucky, Calvin Fairbank and Delia Webster attracted notoriety after they attempted to help runway slaves. In 1844, they were caught aiding slaves Lewis Hayden (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Lewis_Hayden" \o "Lewis Hayden​), his wife Harriet, and their son Joseph to escape to Ohio (with a plan to then head to Canada).​[21]​ Calvin Fairbank, who was from New York, was dealt with more severely than his female accomplice being viewed as much more dangerous. He was tried and convicted and sentenced to serve fifteen years in the penitentiary. However, in 1849 after serving just under five years in jail the governor pardoned him on the condition that he left the state. 

Despite his jail time, Fairbank was not discouraged from his abolitionist activities. In 1851, he returned to Kentucky with the intention of kidnapping a slave and conveying her to freedom, but again Fairbank was thwarted. He was arrested, tried, convicted, and condemned to another fifteen years in jail. This time, his pleas for an early release were ignored by the Kentucky authorities.​[22]​ After over a decade in jail, petitioners continued to request that he be pardoned, claiming they believed that “the time he has been imprisoned a sufficient Punishment for the offence.” In 1863, one petitioner asserted “public Sentiment” and claimed, “I understand that Fairbank had no intention or design of making profit from negro stealing but had then something like monomania on the subject of slavery.” Illness rather than criminality or deviance had motivated Fairbank’s behavior and the petitioner was, therefore, certain that “if released he [Fairbank] will join the Union Army.” The petitioner concluded that if such a condition was actually imposed on him he could not “do any mischief in the Army but on the contrary might do good.”​[23]​ Some Kentuckians would have viewed this as atonement for his wrong-doings while others would have concluded that he was simply slave stealing for a new master, the United States government. Regardless, these requests were denied by the governor of the state and Fairbank remained in jail until his release in the final year of the Civil War.​[24]​ 

Delia Webster, Fairbank’s partner in crime has received less attention in the historiography. As a female agent of the abolitionist movement her experiences and treatment after her capture differed markedly from her male counterparts and in some ways allowed her to be more effective. Webster, originally from Vermont, was schooled at Oberlin College in Ohio and then worked as a teacher in Kentucky and co-founded the Lexington Female Academy. She also successfully assisted many slaves in their escape across the Ohio to freedom. After she was caught for aiding the Hayden (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Lewis_Hayden" \o "Lewis Hayden​)s in their attempt to flee slavery, she too was placed on trial. However, she was not viewed in the same light as her co-conspirator. While Fairbank was considered much more alarming, for he was not only undermining slavery but also encouraging the involvement of a female accomplice, it was supposed that Webster was misguided. She was, therefore, treated very leniently and given the minimum sentence. Female abolitionists like Delia Webster, despite being despised and hated by many, were, due to their sex, still perceived to be naturally dependent creatures. The assumption was that women were less responsible for their actions than those ill-disposed men who led them astray. Rather than an independent and enthusiastic participant, it was presumed she was incited to steal slaves. A jury of married men considered Webster to be part of a “sect that can do no wrong” and presented her with a petition signed by all twelve members, which was to be sent to Governor William Owsley, asking for a pardon before her sentencing “on account of her sex.” Unsurprisingly, Webster refused to sign the petition. Still, as a woman, she was considered to be less of a threat and was sentenced to only two years in prison. Furthermore, after two months in jail, and after winning the sympathy of her married warden, who petitioned on her behalf, the Governor of the State, John Crittenden (whose attempts in 1860 at a compromise to prevent secession failed to save the Union from war) pardoned and released her. Shortly after her imprisonment, she penned and published her own account of the episode entitled A History of the Trial of Miss Delia A. Webster. Though not willing to avoid punishment on “account of her sex,” Webster manipulated her position as a woman and a “spinster,” perceived as dependent, easily swayed without a husband to guide her and in need of protection, to secure her early release and then continue with her abolitionist activities.​[25]​ 
 
Although Webster denied she was an abolitionist in an effort to secure a swift release, her trial and punishment for slave stealing in no way deterred her from her work. In 1854, Webster returned to Kentucky and, partly funded by the abolitionist movement, purchased a farm on the Ohio that became an Underground Railroad station. Although her property and life were threatened she continued to aid runaways. In 1854, a warrant was issued for her arrest in connection with missing slaves in the area. She was arrested and jailed, but this time was able to escape to Indiana where she was hidden but again captured and imprisoned and placed on trial under the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. However, lacking solid evidence to prosecute, the judge discharged Webster. She then continued to operate as part of the Underground Railroad and, also, along with Harriet Tubman and Harriet Beecher Stowe, served as a nurse for the Union during the Civil War.​[26]​ The leniency showed towards Webster and other members of the ‘weaker’ sex who partook in abolitionist activities and the Underground Railroad worked in favor of the cause. In this instance, the swift commutation of Webster’s sentence simply afforded her the opportunity to quickly resume illegally “aiding” or “abducting” (depending on your inclination) slaves, while Calvin Fairbank remained in jail. Webster, we can conclude, had rather cannily exploited contemporary assumptions about her womanly ‘irrational’ and ‘dependent’ nature (or the need to publically uphold such beliefs) in order to further her own, very calculated, subversion of slavery.  
    
She, of course, was but one actor in a greater drama. Against the back-drop of growing sectional conflict, slave stealing acquired a clear political dimension, as it forced planters to consider the cohesiveness of southern society and raised worrying concerns about the loyalty of non-slave-holding whites. At this point, it is worth noting that the ideological constructs surrounding ‘womanhood’ could sometimes work in favor of a variety of women embroiled in what amounted to slave stealing, even though the ‘crime’ was viewed so seriously. Defending womanhood and the southern family was an important rhetorical tenet of southern honor and identity. While abolitionists like Delia Webster were pro-actively and purposefully involved in “slave stealing” campaigns, some Kentuckians like Nancy White, claimed to be incidentally mixed-up in slave stealing. In February 1865, White petitioned the Governor of Kentucky asking to be released from jail half way through her sentence. She explained that she had been “tried and convicted” in 1863 “for assisting in the escape of slaves.” While some slaves were coerced, many others, in the hope of gaining their freedom, willingly conspired with and placed their faith in free whites willing to break the law. Inter-racial co-operation between non-slave owning free whites and the unfree was deemed one of the gravest threats to the southern way of life.​[27]​ In Kentucky, the danger from such collaborations was magnified. As a consequence, Nancy White received a sentence of “four years in the Penitentiary” for her crime. 

However, White felt that her involvement had been misconstrued. In her petition to be pardoned, she pleaded that although “the law proved me guilty,” and she admitted she “certainly did go as far as the Ohio river with parties who I suppose were guilty of the offence,” she claimed she was, in fact, completely “ignorant of the anormity of the Crime.” Equally as important, she sought to evoke sympathy from the governor by stating that she feared she “may not have long to live” and that she “had a little Daughter in Ohio who kneeds what little I can do for her.” Indeed, she proposed that her unenviable circumstances as a humble woman with child, but without a husband to protect and steer her, reinforced her claim that her part in the theft was incidental as “there was no inducement whatever to influence me to take a part in the act.”​[28]​ She evidently hoped that her vulnerable situation would elicit sympathy from the Governor. 

Nancy White’s testimony and admission that she was caught up with those who stole slaves and a horse, indicate that she was one of many poorer whites who at least associated with slaves and members of society who aided them in their escapes or abducted them. Her petition, whether sincere or not, reveals how those who did not necessarily consider themselves either criminals or abolitionists, could become embroiled in slave stealing in the Civil War era. Furthermore, at the height of the sectional tension and during the Civil War, men involved in such transgressions were generally treated more punitively than their female counterparts. White very effectively used her gender and class, her status as a single mother of meagre means, to win favor with the patriarchal authorities that governed the South. Her expression of regret, of ignorance rather than innocence, her ill-health and, most importantly, her status as a poorer white woman with a young dependent and without a husband or family support convinced the governor to pardon and release her.​[29]​ 

Although slave stealers were repellent to most southerners, the numerous cases that reached the courts and circulated in the press, encouraged them to think about more carefully protecting the rights of all small-scale slave owners, even if this somewhat transgressed other social norms. Indeed, the rights of slave-owning women came under the spotlight in many cases and judges and juries often ruled in their favor. Petitions filed by wives accusing their husbands (or his relatives) of stealing or misappropriating their slave property commonly appear across the South in the nineteenth century. In 1850 Flora L. Ewing Cheatham, a minor suing via her guardian Milton P. Wheat, petitioned the Bedford County court in Tennessee claiming her slave, Porter, was stolen and illegally sold out of state to a slave trader. Flora, who resided in Kentucky, inherited Porter in 1844 from her father. In November 1849 Flora married Nicholas P. Cheatham, also a minor, but she left him after a month or two. She claimed his language to her was "such As a Gentleman would not employ to his Slave Much less his wife" and his conduct was "marked with Cruelty and inhumanity." At the time, Flora was suing for a divorce in Kentucky. It transpires, Flora’s husband, now twenty-one years of age, and his father "Secretly and Fraudulently abducted ... Said Slave Porter and Clandestinely Run Him off" to Tennessee where he was sold to a slave trader named Joseph Thompson. Flora attempted to retrieve her stolen slave using agents who tracked down Thompson. On apprehension, the slave trader suggested placing Porter in jail for safe-keeping until the matter was settled, however, “about The witching hour of midnight he [Porter] was mysteriously Spirited away by a Son of Said Thompson" and was hidden by Thompson's business partner, a slave trader named William Little. Flora declared that she never assented to her husband’s sale of the slave, and argued that Kentucky laws barred her husband from claiming Porter by marital rights. Flora was successful in her petition and her request for payment and restitution were granted.​[30]​ 

Mary Ann Owens was married to an even more unruly character. Mary petitioned the courts in July 1841 claiming that her husband, Grandison Owens, while drunk and without provocation, beat her mercilessly. After running out of the house, he followed her, continued to beat her, and ultimately took a shot at her, hitting a dog instead. Mary took refuge at her mother’s house. Since then her husband had sold off her property and, after the death of her mother and inheriting an enslaved woman and her two children, he informed her he intended to remove and sell them. Mary claimed, without any protection, she thought it wise to sell the slaves before they were stolen from her. She asked the courts to compel her husband to reach a financial settlement with her for the items sold, and that she be granted a divorce. While violence and property theft were troubling, it is likely that threatening legal slave ownership helped tip the balance in her favor and encouraged the court to grant all her requests.​[31]​

The following year a much more serious attack was made on the slave property of Elizabeth Gray, also a resident of Kentucky, by her second husband. Gray petitioned Jefferson county court stating that she, upon the death of her husband, John Gray, she sold a slave named King to pay the debts on the estate. The slave Lucy and her child Hannah remained as Elizabeth and her children's inheritance. Elizabeth then got remarried to John P. Fox, who subsequently forged a bill of sale of her slaves, took them to Louisville, sold them, and disappeared. The slaves ended up in the possession of Edward and Robert Crutchfield. Gray petitioned for a divorce from Fox, a motion that was granted and asked the court to restore the stolen slaves to her possession. The court, again, ruled in favor of the female slave owning petitioner.​[32]​ On the eve of the outbreak of civil war, Elizabeth Stevenson charged that her husband, James, had abandoned her and his relatives had stolen her slave woman Harriet and her slave’s six-month-old baby. Husbands who deserted their wives also left them vulnerable to the avarice of their relatives. Stevenson suspected her relatives had or intended to send her stolen slaves out of state to be sold. Elizabeth requested that the sheriff take possession of the slaves and deliver them to her. Although the slaves were gifted to Elizabeth by her father after she was married, the court’s verdict supported the plaintiff; at a tumultuous time defending slave ownership was a clear priority.​[33]​ Women, in particular, were susceptible to the theft and loss of their slave property. Those with children suffered even more so if their slaves were stolen by their husbands. Southern courts recognized and defended them as such; not only as part of their patriarchal duty, but also to demonstrate that attacks on the property of slave owning citizens, male or female, would not be tolerated. 

There are numerous cases like these scattered across the South that need further attention, however, many indicate poverty, martial and family feuds, and sheer greed motivated the unscrupulous to steal the property of their wives or female relations. In some cases, husbands or family members who stole their wives’ slaves clandestinely transported them to another city, region, or state in an effort to avoid local justices and profit from their underground activities. The problems related to slave stealing cases were often complicated and resolving them proved costly and time-consuming. Some cases dragged on over years. The ‘dependent’ legal status of women in a patriarchal society frequently made it difficult for them to defend their property rights, especially in marriage. Yet it would appear that the determination of southern courts to both protect dependents and uphold such rights to slave property, often worked in tandem to their advantage, securing redress from both outright theft and, also, grasping husbands in difficult divorce cases.     

Conversely, the virtues of southern women whose slaves were not under threat or who did not own slaves at all were seldom protected in the same way. In particular, wives who petitioned the county courts for a divorce solely on the grounds that their husband had committed adultery or an "illicit intercourse" with a slave, even if they had been deserted, were not always granted. Indeed, when slave property rights were not under attack, the court made it clear that southern women, in particular non-elite women, had few rights and that they were willing to turn a blind-eye to miscegenation and rape. While defending the ideals of southern womanhood was inextricably bound up with ideologies of southern honor and identity, which even encouraged some to offer leniency to female slave stealers and abolitionists, it became dispensable if the verdict potentially threatened or undermined slave owners’ complete dominion over their female slaves as well as their wives.​[34]​  

It became clear to many southerners, that forging stronger social consensus across the white South was also key to the defense of slavery. Indeed, as the merits of the harsh penalties that were meted out to poor white southern men for slave stealing were debated, some suggested taking a more benevolent approach. It was considered that ignorance and poverty meant that poorer whites could easily be tempted to join bandits, like John Murel, and take part in the underground slave trade slave or be duped and co-opted by abolitionists, like Calvin Fairbank, to work on the Underground Railroad. Recognizing that the exclusion of poor southern whites from slavery no doubt encouraged their involvement in the theft of slaves, led to serious discussions about how to remedy such divisions. Aside from rewarding informers and those who captured and detained runaways, thieves and their accomplices, slave-owning citizens in states such as North Carolina, in the months leading up to the outbreak of war, even debated passing laws that involved the redistribution of slaves held by the state and newly enslaved free people of color to non-slave owners. It was thought that such measures might reduce the threat of internal attacks on their slave property from poor whites and discourage them from collaborating with slave stealers.​[35]​ 

As tensions mounted between the Slave and the Free States, prosecuting or punishing harshly those perceived as vulnerable and easily manipulated, poor southerners and women like Nancy White, became contentious. Unified support across the South was necessary to allow for a vigorous defense of slavery. In 1856, Alex Smith, a Virginian planter, wrote to a friend in Kentucky regarding a case of “kidnappers who stole a number of slaves from the District about 1847 or 8.” Smith recalled that “the abductors of the slaves were arrested and tried under the old Maryland law” and as the crime was deemed “a misdemeanour” it was “punishable by fine and imprisonment if the fine should not be paid.” However, the penalty was $12 000 which they “were unable to pay and were consequently incarcerated according to the law.”​[36]​ Smith further reported that: 

After these men had been confined in the District prison for five years, and had thus suffered no penalty which the slave states would have inflicted, the owners of the slaves...and many other respectable citizens of Washington, petitioned the President to pardon them, on the grounds it was cruel to inflict by a sort of indirection, a heavier punishment for a misdemeanour, than any of the slave states would have inflicted on a felony.​[37]​ 

The author contended that as the southern men convicted of slave stealing “were poor,” and that they were being punished for their poverty and not their crime. He stated that “If they had been rich they could not have been confined to a day- but being poor they were likely to rot in prison-under these circumstances.”​[38]​ In a pointed attack on rich northern abolitionists who paid fines easily for slave stealing or helping slaves to escape and then continued their work, he defended his poor, white, misguided brethren, as did other southern slave owners and citizens. In a concerted effort to construct a robust defense of the South, many southerners who would have previously applauded the severe punishment of anyone caught stealing slaves or involved in an underground trafficking of human property, began to rethink their stance and adapt their attitudes. Against the backdrop of sectional controversy, the criminal activity of slave stealing acquired an important political meaning as a whole society in the South closed ranks in the face of yet another threat to its ‘way of life.’   
 
During the Civil War itself, the potency of slave stealing as a mechanism by which slavery might be destroyed became all too apparent, especially in Kentucky.  Lincoln’s emancipation proclamation, of course, applied only to those areas in rebellion, and therefore it freed no slaves in loyal, Unionist Kentucky. The process of emancipation in the state was, thus, particularly long-drawn out and bitter. In many cases, it amounted to emancipation by stealing and the ‘thief’ was often the Union army, looking for recruits to fill the ranks of its new ‘Colored Regiments.’ In one case that reached the Governor of Kentucky it was claimed by a slave-owner named Dr Cope, that “negro Soldiers with muskets and bayonets came to my house and demanded my only negro man” and after finding him they “took forcible possession of him and compelled him to go with them to the camp of one Col Cunningham who is recruiting a regiment of negro Soldiers here.” The slave in question had, apparently, reported to his owner “he was coerced to the camp a few days ago and urged to become a soldier.” The slave claimed he refused to join and was then threatened. His owner reported that the enslaved man simply “wishes to return to my house.”​[39]​ He, therefore, sought the restoration of his stolen slave from the Union camp and added: 

Had I ever aided and abetted in the Subversions of our Government, or acted or affiliated in any way with traitors to our country, then my lips would be sealed, and I could not have the effrontery to ask protection at your hands. But from the inception of the rebellion to the present moment I have given my heart and my voice and my feeble energies to the Cause of the Union against Secession, law against lawlessness, and order against anarchy.​[40]​

The Union supporting slave-owner then stressed the offence caused by the “forcible, insolent and offensive intrusion of armed negroes upon my premises to drag from my possession my only remaining family Servant who really occupies no mean place in the affections of my family” provoked feelings of outrage and embarrassment that the government would encourage or condone such actions. Finally, he stated “as a citizen of a free country, and as the birthright of a loyal Kentuckian I claim that my right of property Shall be Sacred and inviolate” and asked to be protected against thieves and robbers, even those who were members of the Union army.​[41]​ 

Evidentially tempers flared and those on the same side clashed. In some cases, the loss of slave property and the affront felt by loyal, Unionist slave-owning families, boiled over into action. James Wilson was a farmer and slave-owner who recounted in a letter to the governor the “raids” carried out by Union soldiers in his “part of the State for the purpose of pressing negroes into the service.” In “the Spring 1864 a Lt. Col. Cunningham commanding colored troops” visited Wilson’s farm and “pressed several of my negroes into the service threw down my fences, carried several of my mules and horses away and when my wife remonstrated with them, the officer & men cursed her.”​[42]​ His son, who was at college at the time, “when he heard of the indignity offered his mother” and the attack on his family’s property and the theft of their slaves “was highly and justly incensed” and joined the “rebellion.” Ironically, Wilson’s son, was then charged with “larceny.”​[43]​ Wilson pleaded for his son to be pardoned. The alienation of otherwise loyal Kentucky Unionists, indeed in driving some so far as to enlist in the Confederate army, was an inevitable by-product of ‘emancipation’ by slave-stealing, made worse by the fact that much of the ‘theft’ was being committed by black soldiers. Kentucky’s planters all agreed that having their “most vital interests torn” from them was “a great evil or unbearable oppression” that should not be tolerated by any Kentucky slave owners.​[44]​ Indeed, Calvin Fairbank’s lawyer commented in defense of his crimes that, in fact, during the war “high officials of the U. S. Government with the sanitation of the president or by his orders, are doing the same thing or much worse, under the tyrants state plea of ‘Military necessity.’"​[45]​ 

Perhaps, the most interesting question here is; what was the actual response of the enslaved men who were impressed or encouraged to join the Union army? Unfortunately, more often than not, these remain absent from the historical record. In the case of Dr Cope, a deposition from Mr Bradshaw, “one of our most prominent citizens, a most uncompromising Union Man” offers a little more detail. Bradshaw not only commented on the means being used to steal, “seduce, intimidate and terrify” slaves into military service, but also testified that when Dr Cope’s slave was taken aside and away from his owner’s presence and asked to express whether he wished to join the Union troops or stay with is master he “replied that he would return to his home” and did not wish to join the Union Army.​[46]​ The enslaved man may well have been fearful at the prospect of warfare and have preferred to stay in his current enslaved situation with his owner. Or he may have played on the ambiguities of the situation he found himself in; the illegalities of slave stealing offered him an exit plan if his attempts to leave his master and join the Union troops back-fired. Yet, this is one of those many voices that have been muted in the story of the Civil War.  

Nonetheless, often these cases to some degree expand our understanding of the experience of African Americans during the war. Indeed, it is apparent that the sympathy that slave owners sometimes showed for poor whites mixed-up in the theft of human property also stretched across the color line, and, perhaps, more so in border states like Kentucky, whose geographic position resulted in strongly divided opinion over politics, the economy and slavery.​[47]​ Akin to many southern states, Kentucky had long viewed the threat of free people of color as a serious part of the problem of slave governance. Leading up to the Civil War schemes such as voluntary enslavement and expulsion had been hotly debated. Although the Kentucky legislature failed to pass any laws on voluntary enslavement or forced expulsion of free people of color, the increasing hostility that many Kentuckians felt towards their free black inhabitants in the antebellum era encouraged lawmakers to pass acts that were “directed against free people of color.”​[48]​ However, from the precarious middle-ground on which Kentucky was perched, Lesile Combs, a lawyer, and other Kentuckians thought differently on the matter of free blacks. On hearing that a “mulatto freeman” was  “confined in the penitentiary & has been for a year or more… for attempting to run away with a mulatto girl, who was a Slave, in order to marry her” he petitioned on behalf of the incarcerated free mulatto man.​[49]​ He stated in his petition: 

Now, you know, I am no Abolitionist I would be as far as any man on earth from violating, or justifying the violation of the rights of the owner of a slave. but while the whole State, county & town & village, is filled with white men, in the constant habit of running off slaves—men women & children, without the motive of feeling influencing this coloured man, & yet going "unwhipt of justice", I respectfully urge that it is a cruel mockery to keep this man longer confined—​[50]​

This petition was successful and the man in question was pardoned and released. At no point during the petition was it claimed that the act was misguided or that the “free mulatto” was unaware of what he was doing or even plagued by monomania, as was claimed in the defense of Calvin Fairbank. Cases such as these hinged on the “respectable” character that some free people of color earned. The man in question was considered to be a good, southern citizen by the local community who explained that “He was raised in a barber Shop in Lexington by a remarkably respectable freeman of color, and always bore a fair character for honesty & truth.” Southern solidarity across the color line could sometimes be detected, albeit, even if only to bolster the status quo and slavery rather than undermine it.​[51]​

Even during the Civil War, the ambiguities surrounding slavery and the theft of human property plagued both those who fought on the side of the Union as well as the Confederates. One Union soldier stationed in Kentucky wrote to his sister in January of 1863, complaining “I enlisted to fight for the Union and the Constitution but Lincoln puts a different construction on things and now has us Union men fighting for his Abolition Platform.” Thus, his Commander-in-chief, he decried, had turned him and his comrades into “a hord of Subjugators, house burners and Negro thieves and devastators of personal property.”​[52]​ Freeing or impressing slaves clearly caused ambivalence. Many staunch Unionists were uneasy about breaching laws and depriving another man of his property. They felt that their involvement in these activities was akin to taking part in the illicit trade of stolen slaves. North and South many people were against “negro stealing” and did not want to take part in what they viewed as subversive and criminal acts. At this point, it is useful to remember that it was not so much slavery as an institution that many Unionists were opposed to, but in fact the maltreatment of slaves and disregard for the authority of federal government. 

When Federal troops, who many viewed as “soldier thieves,” were ordered to deal with men who sympathized with and sheltered ‘Guerrillas,’ they often met with violent responses and verbal attacks about the violation of property rights. The local populace objected to men who would steal slaves being placed in positions of authority. Enoch Kingston of the 15th Ky [Kentucky] Cavalry, who was ordered to seize double-barreled guns from citizens to “prevent their falling into the hands of Geuerillas or Rebel soldiers,” found himself in a scuffle with “a noted Rebel, by the name of William Henson.” Henson was not willing to hand over his arms and refused arrest by Union troops and went to his death swearing “he would not be arrested by no damd Negro thieves.”​[53]​ 

Regardless of their orders, the slur on those who trampled on other men’s property rights unsettled many soldiers who fought for the Union. Some evidentially questioned the validity of their actions, despite their acts coming under the category of “belligerent rights’” as recognized “between the United States and the confederate states.” These recruits shared some of the sentiments of their adversaries with regard to the issue of slave stealing.​[54]​ Indeed, in Kentucky a hardline was often taken towards soldiers who interfered with slavery or impressed unwilling slaves. Loyalty to the Union or prior service did not protect federal troops from Kentucky state law. Soldiers who relished their duties as liberators of slaves were not only met with public hostility, but were also subject to the full weight of law. Their allegiance to the Union did not protect them, and men who had served the Union, like Gooden Smith and David C. McDonald,  when they continued their activities after leaving the army found themselves on trial and incarcerated for ‘Negro stealing’ when they helped slaves desert their masters.​[55]​ 

Prior to the outbreak of war slave stealing was an activity which already existed in the gray area between crime and social protest, however, leading up to and during the conflict it acquired a clear political dimension, as it forced slave-owners to reflect on the organization and unity of southern society and raised anxiety over the faithfulness of non-slave owning whites. For Kentucky slave owners, whether Union or Confederate in their sympathies, their ‘way of life’ was indeed ultimately largely destroyed by slave-stealing. However, it was slave stealing of a very particular kind, as the Union army looked to exploit the potential reservoir of manpower that was laboring on Kentucky plantations to fill the ranks of its ‘colored regiments.’ 
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